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ABSTRACT
This paper considers the noise-enhanced distributed detection problem in the presence of Byzantine (malicious)
nodes by suitably adding stochastic resonance (SR) noise. We consider two metrics - the minimum number of
Byzantines (
) needed to blind the fusion center as a security metric and the Kullback- Leibler divergence
increases when SR noise is added at the honest
(DKL) as a detection performance metric. We show that
nodes. When Byzantines also start adding SR noise to their observations, we see no gain in terms of
.
However, the detection performance of the network does improve with SR. We also consider a game theoretic
formulation where this problem of distributed detection in the presence of Byzantines is modeled as a minimax
game between the Byzantines and the inference network, and numerically find Nash equilibria. The case when SR
noise is added to the signals received at the fusion center (FC) from the sensors is also considered. Our numerical
results indicate that while there is no gain in terms of
, the network-wide performance measured in terms of
the deflection coefficient does improve in this case
I. INTRODUCTION
Inference networks have been widely investigated for the past three decades in order to detect or estimate a
phenomenon of interest. Specifically, the distributed detection framework has been considered extensively, wherein
several nodes sense the surrounding environment and collaboratively make a global inference at the fusion center
(FC). It is only in the recent past that the researchers have investigated the problem of security threats in these
networks. In this paper, we consider the problem of Data Falsification attacks (in other words, Byzantine attacks) in
the context of distributed inference networks. Our primary focus is on designing a technique based on the stochastic
resonance (SR) phenomenon to safeguard the network from Byzantine attacks.
SR is a physical phenomenon where the output signals of some nonlinear systems can be amplified by
adding noise to the input. This counter-intuitive phenomenon was first observed by Benzi et al., in [1], and, we have,
in the past [2], explored and developed the theory of SR for statistical inference problems. For a single sensor
detection problem formulated under the Neyman-Pearson (NP) framework, the optimal SR noise to be added to the
observations at the input of the detector has a probability density function (pdf) consisting of two Kronecker delta
functions each occurring with probability and (
). For the Bayesian case, a single delta function with unit
probability (i.e., a constant) is the optimal SR noise pdf. The formulation was also extended to a distributed
detection framework in [3]. Here, we consider the case when some of the sensors deployed in a region of interest
(ROI) deliberately report incorrect decisions to a remotely located fusion center, thus causing a reduction in the
overall detection performance. Here, we show how one could use SR to counter such Byzantine attacks.
Byzantine attacks (Figure 1) are those attacks in which some of the sensors within the network send false
information to the fusion center in order to disrupt the inference process. The Byzantines intend to deteriorate the
detection performance of the network and therefore, modify their local decisions before transmitting to the fusion
center. Marano et al. considered a distributed detection problem for an inference network in the presence of
Byzantines in [4] and presented the optimal attacking distribution for the Byzantines under the error exponent
framework. In finding the minimum fraction of Byzantines (
) needed to make the two hypotheses
indistinguishable to the FC, they assumed that the Byzantines have perfect knowledge about the true hypothesis.

Rawat et al. in [5] considered the case when Byzantines did not have the knowledge regarding hypothesis present,
and gave a closed-form expression for
under both independent and collaborative Byzantine attacks.
In the past, reputation-based schemes at the fusion center have been suggested to counter these attacks.
Rawat et al. analysed a similar problem in [5], for the cases of independent attack by individual Byzantines as well
as the collaborative attack case. They developed optimal attacking strategies, analyzed limits on the network
performance under these attacks and proposed identify-and-eliminate strategies for the fusion center to counter these
attacks. Note that this scheme works only when the percentage of Byzantines in the network is less than 50%. On
the other hand, the adaptive learning scheme proposed by Vempaty et al. in [6] works for any fraction of Byzantines

in the network. They learnt the operating points of each and every node in the inference network not only to identify
the Byzantines, but also to use the learnt Byzantine parameters in an adaptive fusion rule in order to improve the
detection performance over Rawat et al.’s scheme [5].
We suggest the use of SR phenomenon to counter these attacks under more severe cases. We explore the
optimal SR to be added, where it should be added and under what conditions, it provides improvement in security
along with the performance gain, i.e., an increase in
along with an improvement in a detection performance
metric. We have also considered the attacks in the presence of different types of channels between the phenomenon
of interest and the local sensors. We found analytical expressions to quantify the improvement in performance.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II presents a general system model and
performance metrics that are applicable to the different formulations of the noise-enhanced distributed inference
problem, which are later presented in III. We present the two scenarios of SR being employed locally at the sensors
and SR being applied at the FC. In Section IV, we present a game-theoretic formulation of the noise-enhanced
distributed inference problem in the presence of Byzantines. Next, in Section V, we present numerical results for the
different scenarios and formulations presented earlier. Finally, we conclude the work in Section VI with a few
comments on our future work.
II. GENERALIZED SYSTEM MODEL
We consider a binary hypotheses testing problem involving hypotheses H0 and H1, with prior probabilities 0 and
1 respectively. Let the collaborative inference network comprise of N nodes, M of which are Byzantine (malicious)
in nature, and a fusion center which makes a global decision based on the observations collected locally at the sensor
nodes. The Byzantine nodes send false information to the fusion center in order to deteriorate the performance of the
inference network. The inference network tries to employ SR noise as well as counterattack the Byzantines by
changing its strategy of decision making in order to reduce the performance deterioration caused by Byzantines.
We denote the i.i.d. observations made at the ith sensor as Xi, and the distribution of Xi conditioned on the
hypothesis Hk as
= 0, 1. In particular, we consider the signal model
, where = 0 under H0,
for simplicity.
= A under H1 and
Due to the presence of a suboptimal quantizer at the local sensors, under Scenario-1 (In Scenario-2, SR
noise will be added at the FC), SR noise
is added to the observations in order to improve the detection
performance. Hence, the updated observation at the ith sensor is given by
Here, we denote the pdf of the SR noise
added at the honest node as
. Let
be defined as

and that of the Byzantine node as

Then pdf of

can be written as

where
is the noise pdf in the channel between the phenomenon and the sensor and
is the pdf of SR at
the sensor of type T (Honest/Byzantine).
We restrict our discussion to a hard quantizer at the local sensors and therefore, if the suboptimal
quantization function is given by
for a node of type
, the operating point of the honest and the
Byzantine nodes in the ROC is given by
respectively. Note that, in this paper, we focus our
discussion on the use of sign detector as the suboptimal quantizer at the local decision-making stage. These
operating points can be expressed as follows, for a sign detector employed in the sensor of type T.

If is the probability with which a node is Byzantine, then the effective operating point of any given node,
as observed by the FC, is given by

Note that, empirically, can be expressed as the fraction ( ) of Byzantine nodes in the inference network.
We assume that the fusion center has knowledge about the fraction of Byzantines,
in the network, but cannot
differentiate between the honest and Byzantine sensors (same as Rawat et al. in [5]).
Assuming that the channels between the sensors and the FC are ideal, if
denote the set of
transmitted messages by the sensors to the FC, then a global decision
is made by fusing these
individual local decisions as follows.

A. Performance metrics
In this paper, we consider Kullback Leibler Divergence as the detection performance metric and
as
the security performance metric, which are described as follows.
Kullback-Leibler Divergence: DKL has been used as a performance metric for distributed detection systems.
It is a measure of the distance between two probability distributions. Here, the two distributions are in the presence
of the two hypotheses
respectively. As pointed out by Rawat et al. in [5], the
Byzantines would try to maximize the damage they can cause to the sensing process. This can be done by reducing
DKL which results in more decision errors.

Blinding fraction of Byzantines:
is the minimum fraction of Byzantines needed to degrade the
performance of the network (DKL = 0) to the maximum possible extent so that the network is totally blind of the
phenomenon of interest. Similar to Rawat et al., in [5], this serves as a security metric that defines the level of
security, a given system is offering. This can be expressed as follows.

III. NOISE-ENHANCED DISTRIBUTED INFERENCE IN THEPRESENCE OF BYZANTINES
In this section, we analyze the effect of stochastic resonance on the network performance in the presence of
Byzantine attack. Chen et al., in [7], have shown that, for sub-optimal and non-linear systems, SR can be used to
improve the detection performance under a constraint on the false alarm rate. Hence, in this paper, we employ SR
locally at the sensors in Section III-A and do the same at the FC in Section III-B and analyze the gain in the
detection performance.
A. SR employed at the local sensors
We present our results in two different cases. First, we present an ideal case where SR is employed only at
the honest nodes, demonstrating the potential of SR effect in terms of the gain in security. Next, we show the most
general case when SR is applied at both honest and Byzantine nodes.
1) CASE-1 (SR employed only at the Honest Nodes): Here, we investigate the most favorable case to the
network, wherein SR is added only at the honest local sensors and the Byzantines flip their decisions
deterministically. One can achieve this system in practice if there is an underlying scheme as proposed by [5] or [6]
in the network, which lets the FC identify the Byzantine nodes. The nodes which are tagged honest, are later
informed to employ SR through some feedback mechanism, while the nodes that are tagged Byzantine are left
ignorant. Presently, we do not consider the uncertainty involved in the tagging process. This is an important problem
which will be addressed in our future work.
We start off with the following lemma where we analyze the behavior of
and find the optimal SR
pdf that maximizes
from honest sensors’ perspective.
Lemma 1. To maximize

, the optimum SR noise at the honest nodes can be expressed as

i.e. 1-peak SR is optimum for obtaining the maximum
Proof: Define

, for a given

, a is a constant and also a > 0. Therefore,

Thus,
is a monotonically increasing function w.r.t . Therefore, in order to maximize
, we
must maximize . This is very similar to the problem of finding the optimal SR noise pdf for Byzantine detection
(minimizing Pe), as described in [8], and hence is maximized by a 1-peak SR. In other words, 1-peak noise is the
optimal SR signal that maximizes
.
In this case, the network performance improves because the honest nodes’ performance is improved, while
the Byzantines’ performance remains the same. Therefore, we expect an increase in
, thereby improving the
robustness of the network. We show this phenomenon in the following two examples.
a) Example-1 (Gaussian mixture noise): The channel noise between the primary transmitter and
the local sensors is symmetric, Gaussian mixture with pdf,

where,
and H1 hypotheses are,

. Here, we set

. The distribution of

respectively.
If we add 1-peak SR
only at the honest nodes, we can obtain
(12).
b) Example 2 (Cauchy Noise): The pdf for cauchy noise is given by

under H0

as given in Equation

We now compute the optimum 1-peak SR for this channel. Following the discussion of [8], the optimal 1peak SR should satisfy the following equation

On solving the above equation, we get

For the case when 1-peak SR is added at the honest nodes only, the
expression after substituting (13) is
given in Equation (17).
It is easy to see that both the expressions in Equations (12) and (17) are greater than or equal to 0.5.
2) CASE-2 (SR at honest and Byzantine nodes): Both Byzantine and honest sensors apply SR noise to their
true observations in order to improve their respective performances. But the Byzantines’ choice of the SR signal is
the one which reduces the performance of the network to the maximum possible extent, while that of the honest

sensors is to improve the performance of the network. It is easy to see that the optimal SR noise pdf from the
Byzantine’s perspective is also a one-peak pdf.
When both honest and the Byzantine nodes use the optimal SR to improve their performance, then
again turns out to be 0.5, as in the case of no-SR. This can be explained from Equation (8) as both the optimal pdfs
for SR at the honest and the Byzantine nodes are the same. Intuitively, this can be explained by the fact that the
optimal strategy for the Byzantine nodes is to employ the same strategy as that of the honest nodes which employ
optimal strategies to improve the performance of the network. The deterministic flipping of data at the Byzantine
nodes results in the maximum degradation in the performance of the network.
In the case when the honest nodes have a majority in the network, then one can immediately perceive an
improvement in the global detection performance. This is later justified in our numerical results presented in Section
V.
B. SR employed at the FC
Next, we consider the addition of SR noise at the fusion center. We assume a Rayleigh fading model to
account for the non-ideal transmissions between the local sensors and the fusion center. This model for sensor-tofusion center channels has been analyzed in the past (See [9]–[11]). In [10], an optimal likelihood ratio (LR)-based
fusion was derived assuming full knowledge of the instantaneous channel state information (CSI) and local sensor
detection performance indices. In [11], the likelihood ratio based on channel statistics (LRT-CS) was derived and
shown to perform well as compared to the optimal LR fusion rule. The test eliminates the need for instantaneous
CSI, but still requires knowledge of the channel statistics as well as the performance indices of the local sensors. The
fusion rule that requires the least information is the equal gain combiner (EGC) given below.

Fig. 2: Inference network model when SR is employed at the FC

where
is the signal received from the kth node after the SR noise is added (Refer to Figure 2). It has been shown
that the EGC based fusion rule, although suboptimal, performs

reasonably well for most practical SNR values [10]. We, therefore, consider the EGC based fusion rule in this work,
and investigate if its performance can be enhanced using SR in the presence of Byzantines. We use the deflection
coefficient [12],

as a performance criterion due to its simplicity and its strong relationship with the actual overall detection
performance [13].

IV. GAME-THEORETIC MODEL FOR DISTRIBUTED INFERENCE IN THE PRESENCE OF
BYZANTINE NODES
In this section, we will analyse the problem of Byzantine attacks on the network in the presence of SR at the local
sensors from a game theoretic perspective. Byzantines and the network are the two players of the game. The aim of
the Byzantines is to deteriorate the performance of the network while the network’s goal is to survive the Byzantine
attack and improve the performance to maximum possible extent.
We formulate a zero-sum game between the Byzantine nodes and the inference network as a two-player
zero-sum minimax game between the Byzantine nodes and the network with the utility function as the KL
divergence. The set of strategies for the Byzantine node is defined by the p.d.f. of the SR noise,
the Byzantine nodes, while that of the honest nodes is defined by
follows.
Problem Statement. Find

employed at

. Hence, the problem statement is given as

such that

where
, whenever
. Otherwise,
. This is necessary in order to take into account the
performance domination of Byzantines in the game, which the traditional
does not provide us due to its nonnegativity and symmetry about
.
In this paper, we consider an example where
(as given in Equation (9)) is a Gaussian mixture
noise with two peaks. Due to the concavity of the log (·) function, one can easily show that the optimal SR noise is
again a one-peak SR noise. This is because the optimal strategy in the case of a quasiconcave or a quasiconvex
payoff function results in an atomic distribution for the mixed strategy [14]. Therefore,
.

V. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, we present our numerical results for a network of N = 100 sensors. We consider two different cases
to apply SR in the distributed inference network - one is the case when we apply SR only to the observations at the
local sensors and the other being the case when SR is employed at the FC. We present these two scenarios in the
following subsections.
Note that in order to analyze this system, we consider the following three types of SR noises.
•

Optimal 1-peak SR

Note: The optimal 1-peak SR which should be added for this case can be obtained from the discussion of [8].
•
where
•

Optimal 2-peak SR
= 0.3085
Optimal Gaussian SR noise

A. Scenario 1: SR applied locally at the nodes
As discussed earlier in Section III, we first present our results for the case when honest nodes alone employ
SR, and later present the case when both honest and Byzantine nodes employ SR locally.
CASE-1 (SR employed at the honest nodes alone): First, we assume that all the sensors are identical (i.e., in
the absence of SR, all the sensors have the same values of
) and that only the honest sensors add SR. The
Byzantines are attacking independently without any collaboration amongst themselves by simply flipping their
decisions before sending them to the fusion center.

Figure 3 shows the performance enhancement obtained by adding SR to honest nodes only. Figure 3a
depicts the change in
with the no. of Byzantines in the network for the no- SR as well as with-SR case. Since the
no-SR curve is barely visible, it is shown in an expanded view in Figure 3b. Clearly, all the curves follow a similar
trajectory with the difference being their magnitudes and the values on the x-axis at which the
decays to zero
(which correspond to
for the different cases - the minimum fraction of Byzantines required to make the
fusion center blind).
The no SR curve drops to zero when 50% of the sensors are Byzantines (
= 0.5), since at this point,
both the honest and Byzantine sensors become equally strong. The Gaussian SR noise provides some improvement
compared to the no- SR case in terms of both relative magnitudes and
. The optimal 2-peak SR noise gives
further improvement and the performance is maximized by the 1-peak SR noise. As pointed out earlier, the 1-peak
SR is the optimal noise to be added. Table I shows the values of
for all the cases. We have compared the
results obtained from the simulations with our analytical results and both are in close agreement.

Next, we consider the case when the network is heterogeneous. To examine the robustness of the system,
we look at the case if the Byzantines have better performance compared to the honest sensors, particularly when the
probability of detection
is higher compared to the honest sensors for the same value of probability of false
alarm
.
Fig. 4 shows the
vs. No. of Byzantines plot for this scenario. Optimal 1-peak SR noise is added at the
honest local sensors. For the same values of
, we plot three curves for three different increasing values of .
One can see that as the Byzantines become stronger, the network performance deteriorates since
drops to zero
more rapidly with increasing .

Table II shows the decay in the network performance as PD increases in the form of decreasing values of
.

Finally, we present our results for the two examples considered earlier - Gaussian mixture noise and the
Cauchy noise. We present the results for the Cauchy noise case alone in Figure 5, while Table III shows the
performance comparison in terms of
of both the noisy channels.
Figure 5 shows the plot of KL divergence against the number of Byzantines in the network when μ = 1 and
= 1. Again, the significant improvement in the network performance after adding SR as compared to the no-SR
case is articulated through our results.
CASE-2 (SR employed at both honest and Byzantine nodes): We present this case for three different types
of SR signals. Fig. 6 shows the
vs. No. of Byzantines curve. The curves

start from the same point on the y-axis as in the SR-only-at-honest sensors case. However, all the three curves decay
quite rapidly and reach zero when 50% of the sensor population becomes Byzantines. This happens in the same way
as we had in the no SR case where
dropped to zero when Byzantines became as strong as the honest sensors. So,
the result is intuitively correct. For all the three cases, we get
= 0.5.

Although this case did not provide the necessary robustness in terms of security, later in the paper, we will
analyze the problem from a game-theoretic perspective in order to find the optimal strategies employed by the
Byzantine nodes and the inference network.
B. Scenario 2: SR applied at the FC
In this scenario, we consider a simple example where a one-peak noise is applied at the FC. We simulate
the example scenario for about 100,000 Monte-Carlo runs and calculate the deflection coefficient as given by
Equation (19). Figure 7 shows how the deflection coefficient varies with increasing number of Byzantines in the
network. It is evident from the figure that SR provides detection performance improvement, but since the deflection
coefficient becomes zero when =
= 0.5, there is no improvement in the design from a security perspective.
This can be attributed to the fact that SR is employed at both the Byzantine and the honest sensors. In the future, we
will investigate the case where SR is applied to the honest nodes’ receptions alone at the FC.

C. Game-Theoretic Formulation of Inference in the presence of SR and Byzantine attacks
In this paper, we present results only for the example in which
and as
discussed earlier, the SR noise
is a one-peak noise with p.d.f. given by
for a node of type T (Example
considered by Chen et al., in [7]). Here, T = H/B, where H stands for Honest and B stands for Byzantine. Note that
we focus on finding those saddle points that minimize
with respect to cB, while maximize the same with
vary with the SR noise parameters cH and cB respectively,
respect to cH. Figure 8 depicts how the contours of
when = 0.5. In this case, we find that when cH = cB = 0 (the case when no SR is applied at either the honest or the
Byzantine node), the network is blinded since
= 0. One can clearly observe that, for a given SR signal at the
honest node, a deviation in cB from zero results in a performance degradation and vice versa. Also, note that the
Nash equilibria are the points (-3.5, -3.5), (-3.5, 2.5), (2.5, -3.5) and (2.5, 2.5). These are very similar to the optimal
SR signals computed by Chen et al., in [7] when SR is not applied locally at the sensors. Due to symmetry in the
example considered in Figure 8, all the equilibria correspond to
= 0.
Figure 9 plots the contours of
against cH and cB, when = 0.2. Note that the equilibria points are very
close to those in the case of
= 0.5 case (with a slight skew), but the detection performance at the equilibria in
terms of
improved with decreasing .

VI. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we have shown that SR phenomenon provides robustness to the designs along with the performance
improvement, especially when the scenario is favorable to the inference network. If the Byzantines simply attack by
flipping their decisions and not employ SR noise in their designs, then the
increased beyond 50%, providing
us with better security. In the case when Byzantines are equally powerful with SR being employed in the designs,
then the robustness is not different from the no-SR case, but we found a performance improvement in terms of
detection if the honest nodes form the majority. We also found that the p.d.f. of the optimal SR noise in the presence
of Byzantine attackers is the same as that of the results given by Chen et al., in [7], when there are no Byzantines in
the network.
Future work will involve the case when SR is employed at both local sensors and the FC. Also, we will
investigate other channel-aware fusion strategies. Another important problem that we will look at is the problem of
SR at honest nodes when the Byzantine-identification scheme is not error-free. It will also be interesting to
investigate the different game-theoretic formulations, such as the case where SR is employed at FC and Bayesian
game models are considered with incomplete information.
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